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ARISTOTLE, PLOTINUS, AND SIMPLICIUS ON THE
RELATION OF THE CHANGER TO THE CHANGED
ARISTOTLE
The longest continuous discussion of change (ki´nhsiv) in the Aristotelian corpus is
book G of the Physics. There are, of course, many difficult issues raised in
this book but, for the purposes of this examination, a summary of Aristotle’s con-
clusions pertaining to the location of change suffices, and so we can keep our
account brief.
Aristotle defines change as ‘the actualization of the potential as such’ (h tou˜
duna´mei o ntov e ntele´ceia, F} toiou˜ton, Phys. G 1, 201a10–11), the meaning of
which is best grasped through one of his own examples. A certain collection of
boards and bricks is potentially a house in so far as they fulfil the material require-
ments of a house and can therefore receive the form of house.1 To actualize this
potential is to build a house out of these materials, and so we can say that in this
case change is defined as the actualization of these materials’ potential to be a
house, that is, it is the process of being built into a house (Phys. G1, 201b5–15).
One attractive feature of such an abstract definition of change is its broad applica-
bility. The same definition can be used to account for human acts (kinh´seiv). For
example, when a man who knows how to build a house is himself in the process
of building a house, this act can be described as the actualization of his potential
(that is, his knowledge of how) to build houses. However, as economical as this defi-
nition might be, it raises a serious concern: what is the relationship between the
change that takes place with respect to the builder—the act of building or the actua-
lization of his potential to build a house—and the change that takes place with respect
to the materials—the process of being built into a house or the actualization of their
potential to become a house? Aristotle’s response to this concern is too well known to
warrant discussion here. It is enough for us to catalogue some of its significant
features:
(1) The actualization of the man’s potential to build is identical to the actualization of
the materials’ potential to become a house. In other words, there takes place only
a single change, though this change can be described from two different
perspectives—the builder’s and the materials’ (Phys. G 3, 202a13–21).
(2) This single change takes place in the changed rather than in the changer. For
example, the building of a house occurs in the boards and stones, and not in
the builder himself (Phys. G 3, 202a21ff.).
(3) Although the change is localized exclusively in the changed, it is ‘not cut off’
(ou k a potetmhme´nh) from the changer (Phys. G 3, 202b6–8).2
1 For some general guidelines on fulfilling material requirements and so qualifying as poten-
tially x, see Metaphysics H4-5 and Q7.
2 A completed house has the form of house as something cut off, but what is still in the
process of being made into a house does not (cf. Simpl. in Phys. 445.34–446.5). The house
being built and the student being taught are subjects—not of the forms of house and
knowledge—but of the changes towards those forms, and these changes surely do not occur
independently of their initiators, that is, the teacher and the builder.
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(4) Every change involves a transferral of form from the changer to the changed
(Phys. G 2, 202a9–13).3
In what follows I shall first show how selectively Plotinus draws from this list and
then make some suggestions aimed at explaining this selectivity. I shall subsequently
show that Simplicius’ account of this in his commentary on the Physics is directly
influenced by Plotinus, although he departs from Plotinus by not shying away from
any of these four features. Finally, I shall propose a possible explanation of
Simplicius’ divergence from Plotinus in this regard.
PLOTINUS
6.3.23 is one of the last chapters of Plotinus’ critical examination of the doctrine of
categories in 6.1–3 and forms part of his discussion of change (ki´nhsiv) in 6.3.21–
6. The guiding question of this chapter concerns the relationship between change
and sensible things, and Plotinus’ primary response to this question is that change
is distinct from the sensible things that are changed, even though it is only through
the perception of sensible things in change that we are able to perceive the change
itself. This raises the question for him of what the change is in, which brings us to
lines 13–20 (I shall explain the underlining shortly):
e n ti´ni ouIn h ki´nhsiv, o tan a llo kin}˜, kai` o tan de` e k th˜v e nou´shv duna´mewv ei v e ne´rgeian i }; aIra e n
tw˜¼ kinou˜nti; kai` pw˜v to` kinou´menon kai` pa´scon metalh´yetai; a ll e n tw˜¼ kinoume´nw¼; dia` ti´ ouIn
e lqou˜sa ou me´nei; h dei˜ mh´te tou˜ poiou˜ntov a phlla´cqai mh´te e n au tw˜¼ eiInai a ll e x au tou˜ me`n
kai` ei v e kei˜no, ou k e n e kei´nw¼ de` a potetmhme´nhn eiInai, a ll a p e kei˜nou ei v e kei˜no, oiFon pnoh`n ei v a llo.
What, then, is the change in when it changes another thing, and when it goes to actuality from an
immanent potentiality? Is it, then, in the changer? And how will what is passively changed par-
ticipate in it? Or is it in the changed? But then why, having come, does it not remain? In fact
change should neither be separated from the efficient cause (tou˜ poiou˜ntov) [i.e. the changer]
nor be in it; rather, it should come out of the changer to the changed – but it should not be
in the changed as something cut-off [i.e. from the changer], but [go] from the changer to the
changed just like a breath [breathed] into something else.
Plotinus’ examination of change in connection with sensible things has led him back
to the question that Aristotle poses in Phys. G 3, 202a13ff.: Is change in the changer or
in the changed? Like Aristotle, Plotinus answers with (2) from the list above: change
is in the changed—with two clarifications. Both are familiar from Plotinus’ theory of
causation, but each also corresponds to one of the four significant features of our
summary of Phys. G 2, 202a9–G 3, 202b28. The first picks up on (3) from our list
above, insisting that change is in the changed without being cut off from the
changer (line 19).
The use of negated a pote´mnein to express the continued dependence of a product on
its cause is found frequently throughout the Enneads and in application to all levels of
reality, for example, Intellect (5.3.12.39ff.), Soul and souls (1.1.2.9–13, 3.5.4.10–11,
4.3.12.3–4, 4.4.29.46–52, 4.9.5.6–7), Nature (6.2.22.31–4) and the sensible world
3 ‘The changer will always transmit some form, either a substantial form or a qualitative form
or a quantitative form’ (eiIdov de` a ei` oi setai´ ti to` kinou˜n, h toi to´de h toio´nde h toso´nde). When a
builder builds a house, he is transferring the form of house from his soul to the potential house,
that is, to the stones and boards, and for a teacher to teach a student is for the former to transmit
some form of knowledge from his own soul to the latter’s soul (cf. DA 417b12–16). In other
words, a builder is building just in so far as he is in the process of transferring the form of
house to the stones and boards, and a house is being built only in so far as it is in the
process of receiving the form of house from the builder.
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(2.9.16.11–12, 4.3.9.29–31). Plotinus’ favourite empirical examples of this point are
light (1.7.1.24–5, 4.4.29.41–5, 5.3.12.39ff.) and the images in mirrors (6.2.22.31–4,
6.4.10.11–15). It is no doubt an interesting question to what extent (if any) this com-
ponent of Plotinus’ thought is ultimately due to Aristotle’s utterance in Phys. G3,
though it is one that will not be pursued here.4
The second clarification is that change involves transferring something ‘from the
changer to the changed just like a breath [breathed] into something else’ (line 20),
which nicely corresponds to (4) on our list. Here, too, we are dealing with a familiar
feature of Plotinus’ theory of causation, as the example of ‘breath into something else’
shows. This example—itself not found in Phys. G3—is disappointingly concise and
in itself offers little illustrative help. Yet, despite being the only instance of pnoh´ in the
Enneads, it is solidly Plotinian. In order to understand its Plotinian sense, we need to
look at several passages where Plotinus uses breath metaphors via the Greek words
e mpnei˜n and/or a napnoh´ to illustrate his meaning. The most central of these passages
is 3.2.4.12–16:
zwh` ga`r e ntau˜qa kinoume´nh, e kei˜ de` a ki´nhtov. Edei de` ki´nhsin e x a kinhsi´av eiInai kai` e k th˜v e n au t}˜
zwh˜v th`n e x au th˜v gegone´nai a llhn, oiFin e mpne´ousan kai` ou k a tremou˜san zwh`n a napnoh`n th˜v
h remou´shv ouIsan.
For life here [i.e. in the sensible region] is in change, but there [i.e. in the intelligible] is unchan-
ging. And so change must derive from changelessness, and from the life that is in changeless-
ness comes another life that is from it – a life that, as it were, breathes (e mpne´ousan) and stirs and
is an exhalation (a napnoh`n) of the life that rests.
The relevance of this passage to 6.3.23 should be clear: both passages concern one
thing creating change in another while itself remaining unchanged. And here again
the latter is likened to a breath proceeding from the former. But this time the metaphor
has been placed in a more familiar background. Plotinus is thinking of ontological
procession or emanation: to say that the life of change is a breath proceeding from
the unchanging life is to say that the one emanates from the other.
If we reflect on Plotinus’ doctrine of procession, we can see why he finds this breath
metaphor so appealing. First, for those substances that do breathe, breathing is an
essential activity. Indeed, it, like emanation, is an activity that proceeds without
any planning or choice. Second, breathing suggests a kind of giving that does
not entail any loss for the giver, just as is the case with emanation, in so far as the
air exhaled is not an essential constituent of the exhaler’s nature. Finally, an exhala-
tion’s existence is completely dependent on the continued activity of the exhaler, just
as ontologically lower entities are dependent on the activities of the higher ones.
Hence, this metaphor is particularly well suited to explain how one substance can
come to be by emanating from an ontologically prior substance.5
4 For one opinion, see A. C. Lloyd, ‘Plotinus on the genesis of thought and existence’,
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 5 (1987), 155–86: ‘Plotinus regularly borrows the meta-
phor from the formula of the Physics: the product is not cut off from its origin’ (168).
5 For another use of the metaphor, see e.g. 5.1.2.2 where Plotinus describes the soul’s
demiurgic function of creating living things as ‘breathing’ life into them (e mpneu´sasa au toi˜v
zwh´n). Likewise at 6.7.23.22–4 where the Good is said to ‘breathe’ intellect, life and being
into all things (e mpne´on nou˜n, e mpne´on zwh´n, ei de´ ti mh` du´natai zh˜n, eiInai). Proclus uses it in a
similar manner, e.g. at In Tim. 1.383.6–7, where he says that the bodies in the pre-cosmic
state have motion ‘because they have been breathed into by Nature’ (w v u po` fu´sewv
e mpneo´menon), and at 3.327.7–8, where we are told that ‘the soul moves the body by breathing
the power of change into it’ (fe´rei me`n ga`r h yuch` to` sw˜ma du´namin e mpne´ousa kinh´sewv).
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Hence, Plotinus describes change as a process that transfers something from the
changer to the changed, a process that takes place in the changed without being cut
off from the changer. What, then, of the central insight of Phys. G3, namely (1)
that the actuality (e ntele´ceia) of the changer is identical to the actuality of the
changed? Plotinus passes over it. This probably has little to do with Plotinus’ systema-
tic avoidance of Aristotle’s term e ntele´ceia, since he is quite capable of using
e ne´rgeia as a substitute for it.6 It likely has much more to do with the rest of his
theory of causality and emanation, which describes the procession of one level of
reality out of another in terms of two e ne´rgeiai, described most fully in 5.4.2.27–33:
Ene´rgeia h me´n e sti th˜v ou si´av, h d e k th˜v ou si´av e ka´stou. kai` h me`n th˜v ou si´av au to´ e stin e ne´rgeia
e kaston, h de` a p e kei´nhv, h n dei˜ panti` e pesqai e x a na´gkhv e te´ran ouIsan au tou˜. oiFon kai` e pi` tou˜
puro`v h me´n ti´v e sti sumplhrou˜sa th`n ou si´an qermo´thv, h de` a p e kei´nhv h dh ginome´nh e nergou˜ntov
e kei´nou th`n su´mfuton t}˜ ou si´a¼ e n tw˜¼ me´nein pu˜r. Ou tw dh` ka kei˜.
The one kind of activity of each thing is of substance, the other is from substance. And the
activity of substance is each thing itself, whereas the activity from substance is that which
must necessarily follow everything, being different from it. For example, even in the case of
fire, there is one heat that fills its substance, and another heat that immediately comes from
that heat when the fire, in remaining fire, exercises the activity that is intrinsic to its substance.
So, too, in the intelligible region.7
Each level of reality has its own internal activity which constitutes its substance and to
this extent remains in it, but this activity automatically brings forth a second, external
activity which passes on some derivative form of its substance to something else.
Plotinus employs this distinction throughout the Enneads, albeit through a number
of different expressions: what is called h th˜v ou si´av (e ne´rgeia) in the preceding quota-
tion is also referred to as (h ) e n e autw¼˜ or au t}˜ (2.9.8.22–3, 3.7.12.7, 6.2.22.26) as well
as e nto´v (4.5.7.16)—hence the designation ‘internal8—pro`v au th`n (3.7.12.7) and
su´mfuton t}˜ ou si´a¼ (5.4.2.32). And h e k (or a po`) th˜v ou si´av (e ne´rgeia) is also referred
to as (h ) e x or par au tou˜ (6.2.22.26–7, 5.1.6.34, cf. 6.7.18.6), ei v a llo (2.9.8.23) or ei v
to` po´rrw (4.5.7.19, 21, 22), pro`v to` e xw (4.5.7.34, 5.1.6.31–2) e n poih´sei kai` gene´sei
(3.7.12.7–8) and e ne´rgeia deute´ra (4.5.7.16), whereby its similarity and derivative-
ness is often underlined with terms such as o moi´wma (4.5.7.18), ei dwlon (4.5.7.44),
peri´lamyiv (5.1.6.28), ei kw´n (5.1.6.33), i cnov (5.3.7.24).
Although sometimes it looks as though Plotinus means to identify an entity with its
prior’s external activity,9 strictly speaking this is not quite right. The external activity
that proceeds, for example, from the One is not Nou˜v itself but, as it were, a precursor
toNou˜vwhich Plotinus sometimes calls ‘(undefined) life’. This prior activity becomes
6 Plotinus employs e ntele´ceia only eleven times. Of these, ten are in 4.7.85 where Plotinus
argues against Aristotle’s definition of soul as the e ntele´ceia of a potentially living body.
The other (4.2.1.3) simply refers back to the discussion in 4.7.85. However, Plotinus often sub-
stituted e ne´rgeia for e ntele´ceia (see 2.5 passim and the use of e ne´rgeia in discussions of the
nature of Intellect, e.g. 5.3.5), as did Aristotle himself on many occasions (cf. Bonitz, Index
Aristotelicus [Berlin, 1870], 253b46ff.). According to Beutler and Theiler (Plotins Schriften
2b [Meiner, 1956–71], 430) one can already in Alexander begin to see the gradual replacement
of e ntele´ceia by e ne´rgeia.
7 The double activity theory also comes up in 2.9.8.22–5, 3.7.12.6–8, 4.5.7.15ff., 5.1.6.28–
39, 5.3.7.23–4, 5.9.8.13–15, 6.2.22.24–9, 6.7.18.5–6, 6.7.21.4–6, 6.7.40.21–4. And see
C. Rutter, ‘La doctrine des deux actes dans la philosophie de Plotin’, Revue philosophique
146 (1956), 100–6.
8 Cf. the frequent use of me´nein 4.5.7.19, 5.1.6.30ff., 5.4.2.33, and so on.
9 E.g. 5.3.12.39–41 where the hypostasis Nou˜v is described as ‘the activity that, as it were,
flows from it [i.e. the One] like light from the sun’ (th`n me`n a p au tou˜ oiFon r uei˜san e ne´rgeian w v
a po` h li´ou fw˜v).
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Nou˜v when it turns back to its source, the One, and becomes defined.10 This turning-
back is the next internal activity in the series and is identical to Nou˜v itself. For this
reason, the external activity can also be referred to as h pro`v to` ka´tw (6.2.22.30), and
the internal activity as h pro`v to` a nw (6.2.22.29–30).
This theory of double activity efficiently ties together (2)–(4) from our list above.
(4) A prior substance, that is, the internal activity, sends out from itself an external
activity. (3) This external activity is continuously dependent on its source, and so
is not ‘cut off’ from it. Note that even Plotinus’ favourite images for a thing’s not
being ‘cut off’ from its cause, light and images in mirrors, are also—along with
the heat of fire11—his preferred examples for double activity: light (4.5.7.33–44,
5.1.6.29–30) and images in mirrors (4.5.7.44–50). Moreover, (2) the external
activity, qua external, occurs outside of its source, or as Plotinus at one point says,
e n a llw¼ (5.3.7.25). But (1) is incompatible with this theory in so far as the activity
of the changer, that is, the internal activity, is not numerically identical to the activity
of the changed, the external activity. Rather, the latter is only a o moi´wma of the former.
SIMPLICIUS
We have strong textual reasons for believing that Simplicius, in his commentary on
Aristotle’s Physics, is directly influenced by these lines of Plotinus. As part of his dis-
cussion of Phys. G3, 202a13–21, Simplicius writes:
e n ou n e sti tw¼˜ u pokeime´nw¼ h e ne´rgeia kai` to` pa´qov a rcome´nh me`n a po` tou˜ e nergou˜ntov, kai` e kei˜qen
to` eiIdov e pife´rousa, e nsthrizome´nh de` tw¼˜ pa´sconti, kai` diatiqei˜sa tou˜to kata` th`n a po` tou˜
poiou˜ntov tou˜ ei douv e ndosin oiFon pnoh`n ei v a llo, w v mh´te a phlla´cqai tou˜ poiou˜ntov mh´te e n
au tw¼˜ eiInai, a ll e x e kei´nou me´n, e n e kei´nw¼ de` ou k a potetmhme´nhn. kai` ei me`n a po` tou˜ pooiou˜ntov
kai` kinou˜ntov a rcoi´meqa, poiei˜n kai` kinei˜n e stin, ei de` a po` tou˜ pa´scontov kai` kinoume´nou,
pa´scein kai` kinei˜sqai. i ste´on de` o ti e n tou´tw¼ tw¼˜ cwri´w¼ oi me`n polloi` safe´steron ou tw
gra´fousi tau´thn th`n le´xin. “e ntele´ceia ga´r e sti tou´tou u po` tou˜ kinhtikou,” o de` "ndro´nikov
ou twv. “e ntele´ceia ga´r e sti tou˜ kinhtou˜ kai` u po` tou´tou.” kai` e xhgei˜tai o ti ka n e xwqen }I to`
kinou˜n, e k th˜v e nou´shv duna´mewv ei v e ne´rgeian a go´menon, u f e autou˜ kinei˜sqai dokei˜ to` kinou´menon.
(in Phys. 440.5–17)
The agency then, is one in substrate with the patiency;12 it begins from the agent and from here
brings the form, but is implanted in the patient; and it manages this by imparting the form from
the efficient cause, just like a breath into something else, so that it is neither separated from the
efficient cause nor in it—rather, it comes out of the one, and is in the other though not as some-
thing cut off [i.e. from the changer].13 And if we begin from the efficient cause and the changer,
[change] is to act and to change, but if we start from the patient and the changed, [change] is to
be acted on and to be changed. And one should know that in this spot most write this passage
rather clearly as follows: ‘For it is the actualization of this by the source of change.’ But
Andronicus writes it this way: ‘For it is the actualization of the changed and by this.’ And he
takes this to mean that even when the changer is external, the changed seems to be changed
by itself, since it is brought to actuality from an immanent capacity.
As the underlining illustrates, this passage has such remarkable philosophical and lin-
guistic similarities to 6.3.23.13–20 that we can conclude that Simplicius is drawing
directly on Plotinus here. This has gone unnoticed by both Henry and Schwyzer in
10 6.7.17.11–26. For a discussion of this passage and of this issue in general, see Lloyd,
op. cit. especially 166 and 177.
11 5.1.6.34, 5.3.7.23–4, 5.4.2.30–3, 5.9.8.13–15, 6.7.8.15–16.
12 Simplicius substitutes e ne´rgeia and pa´qov for Aristotle’s poi´hsiv and pa´qhsiv at Phys. G
3,202a22ff.
13 J. O. Urmson’s recent translation (Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 3 [London, 2002],
p. 58) of this line is not right: ‘It is from the agent but not excised from being in it.’
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their edition of Plotinus’ Enneads and byDiels in his edition of Simplicius’ commentary
on the Physics. It is, of course, possible that Plotinus and Simplicius are both consult-
ing some unknown third source. After all, it is well known that Plotinus frequently
engages with the thought of his philosophical predecessors without explicitly men-
tioning them by name. This anonymity sometimes takes the form of a subjectless
fa´si or fh´si,14 but Plotinus often does not even show his readers this courtesy.15
Further, this form of engagement is not limited to only polemical contexts. He
might, for example, approvingly quote or paraphrase a line of Hesiod (4.3.14.7),
Homer (1.6.8.16), or any number of philosophers (cf. 5.9.5.29–32)—again without
the slightest indication that he is doing so. Hence, readers are constantly confronted
with the problem of identifying not only Plotinus’ philosophical opponents but also
his philosophical debts, and they confront it in a particularly acute form when he is
dealing with post-Hellenistic philosophers, since as a rule he does not refer by
name to anyone after Epicurus (to whom he refers at 2.9.15.8). Moreover, it is well
known that throughout Plotinus’ examination of the Aristotelian categories in 6.1–
3 he drew on the work of commentators such as Lucius and Nicostratus.16 It might
seem quite likely, then, that Plotinus, while pondering Aristotle’s question, selectively
helped himself to some of the ideas he found in a commentary. One might even
suspect that Plotinus’ source was Andronicus, since it is in connection with
Andronicus that Simplicius uses the phrase ‘to actuality from an immanent
capacity’—a phrase that we find word for word in 6.3.23.13–20 as well.17
Nevertheless, I believe the Plotinian character of the ‘breath’ metaphor that we estab-
lished above gives us good reason to conclude that this is a case where Simplicius is
simply drawing on Plotinus.
In this brief passage one can see that Simplicius acknowledges all four features
listed above: (1) the actualization of the changer is identical to that of the changed
(lines 5–6);18 (4) change involves a transferal of a form from the changer to the
changed (lines 7–8); and (2) it is localized in the changed (line 9), but (3) is not
‘cut-off’ from the changer (line 10). And so what we have in Simplicius is a
Neoplatonist exegete of Aristotle who, on the one hand, incorporates some of
Plotinus’ insights into his interpretation of this passage, but who, on the other
hand, is—unlike Plotinus—unbothered by the identification of the two actualizations.
This, of course, raises the question of why this identification seems so objectionable to
one Neoplatonist but not to the other, and I would like to venture an answer to this
question.
14 E.g. 2.1.6.25.
15 E.g. 6.4.4.24–5.
16 This allegation is likewise based on Simplicius’ own commentary. To my knowledge, this
is argued most extensively by K. Praechter in ‘Nikostratos der Platoniker’, Hermes 57 (1922)
481–517 at 512ff. Others who agree with Praechter’s conclusion include S. Strange,
‘Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic interpretation of the Categories’ in Aufstieg und
Niedergang der Ro¨mischen Welt 2.36.2, 955–74, esp. 956 and 965; K. von Fritz
‘Nikostratos’ in RE XVII.1, 547.3–551.31, see 551.23–5; and W. Capelle ‘Lukios’ in RE
XIII.2, 1791.6–1797.16, see 1792.36ff.
17 Plotinus’ discussion of other categories also bears strong resemblances to Andronicus’: see
Simpl. in Cat. 269.38–270.3 (cf. 6.1.11), 347.18–25 (cf. 6.1.13.10–13), 358.8–11 (cf. 6.1.14).
18 A clearer statement of this identity is found just prior to this passage (439.26–9): dia` ti´ ouIn
h tou˜ kinhtou˜ e ne´rgeia ki´nhsi´v e sti kai` mh` ma˜llon h tou˜ kinou˜ntov; h ou k a llh e sti`n h tou˜
kinhtikou˜ e ne´rgeia. e sti ga`r kinhtiko`n e nerghtiko`n tou˜ kinhtou˜. “Mi´a” ouIn “h a mfoi˜n
e ne´rgeia”.‘Why, then, is change the activity of the changeable and not rather the activity of
the changer? Because the activity of the changer is not distinct. For a changer is an actualizer
of the changeable. Thus, “the activity of both” is “one”.’
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As we have seen above, Plotinus’ hesitation with respect to (1) probably derived
from his theory of double activity, and so Simplicius’ willingness to agree to (1)
suggests that he did not adopt this theory. Indeed, I suspect this was the case. It is
true that the structure of Neoplatonic metaphysics that one encounters in
Simplicius bears many similarities to that of Plotinus, including much of the language
of procession.19 Both, for example, speak of lower substances ‘proceeding
(proi¨e´nai)20 from’ and ‘enjoying’ (a polau´nein) 21 ‘radiation’ (e llamyiv or
perila´myiv) from their priors.22 But nowhere, I claim, does Simplicius explain proces-
sion by means of Plotinus’ theory of double activity. There is, of course, no great
proof stone for such negative claims. Nevertheless, this claim can be partially verified
by checking to see what Simplicius has to say about Plotinus’ favourite examples of
double activity—light, heat and the images in mirrors—as well as by searching the
Simplician corpus23 to see if he uses the designations for internal and external activity
that Plotinus uses. Investigation shows that Simplicius does not make use of Plotinus’
designations. The closest we get is a passage in his commentary on the Physics where
he provides a long quotation of Damascius in which the theory seems to appear.24
Otherwise we find only some discussion of the Aristotelian distinction between first
and second actuality.25 But Simplicius does not distinguish the activity th˜v ou si´av
from that e k (or a po`) th˜v ou si´av,26 nor that pro`v to` a nw from that pro`v to` ka´tw,
nor that e n e autw¼ (or au t}˜) from that e x (or par ) au tou˜.
Moreover, we can see that none of Plotinus’ three examples is employed by
Simplicius to explain double activity. Regarding the nature of light, Simplicius is
even rather non-committal at times.27 As for heat, even when Simplicius does draw
19 For a description of procession that is characteristic of Simplicius’ commentaries on
Aristotle, see in Cael. 93.2ff. The metaphysics of his commentary on Epictetus seems to
diverge from Plotinus’ metaphysics in some respects. See K. Praechter, ‘Simplikios,’ RE
IIIA,1, 204.8–213.9, especially 206.66ff. and 212.11ff.
20 E.g. Simpl. in Cael. 93.13 and Plotinus 5.1.6.36, 5.3.9.12, 6.4.4.19.
21 E.g. Simpl. in Phys. 630.15; Plotinus 5.1.6.37.
22 E.g. Simpl. in Phys. 314.12–4 (cf. 965.29–30, 630.15 and in Cael. 303.22); Plotinus
5.1.6.28 and see J. H. Sleeman and G. Pollet, Lexicon Plotinianum (Brill, 1980), 361.40–54.
23 I do not include the commentary onDe Anima in the Simplician corpus on the grounds that
it has long been held to be spurious. This verdict has recently been repeated and defended by
J. Urmson in the introduction to his translation of in De An. 1.1–2.4 (Londo, 1995), 2–4 and by
H. Blumenthal in his Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity (London, 1996), pp. 65–71.
In his contribution to Priscian On Theophrastus on Sense Perception with ‘Simplicius’ On
Aristotle On the Soul 2.5–12 (Duckworth, 1997), C. Steel makes a more extensive case
against Simplicius’ authorship and argues that the author is in fact Priscian of Lydia (105–40).
24 In Phys. 625.6–9: kai` th`n kat e ne´rgeian [viz. dia´stasin] ditth´n, th`n me`n t}˜ ou si´a¼ su´mfuton,
kaq h n e n sunecei˜ r o}˜ e stin h ou si´a, th`n de` a po` th˜v ou si´av proi¨ou˜san, kaq h n a llote a lla e nergei˜
paratetagme´nav e conta kai` ou k a qro´av ta`v e nergei´av. Here much of Plotinus’ vocabulary is
found again.
25 E.g. in Phys. 415.2ff.
26 The distinction Simplicius makes at in Phys. 405.24–6.16 and 428.5–12 is not that of
internal and external activity. Here he distinguishes between two kinds of change (ki´nhsiv).
On the one hand there is the kind of change that Aristotle is concerned with—ordinary sensible
change that takes place in time. On the other hand there is intelligible change that Simplicius
attributes to Plato and that ‘is measured by eternity’ (406.10–11). This latter change is
described as th`n a po` tou˜ o ntov prw´thn e xana´stasin ei v duna´meiv te kai` e nergei´av zwtika´v te
kai` noera`v. . .pantelw˜v ouIsan a meta´blhton (405.27–9) and th`n a po` th˜v ou si´av e xana´stasin
tou˜ e nergou˜ntov (428.6). The language is similar, but the distinction is obviously different,
since both internal and external activity can take place both in time (as with fire’s heat) and
outside time (as with the procession of hypostases).
27 See in Cat. 182.11–13: to` ga`r fw˜v kai` ei tou˜ h li´ou e sti`n ou le´getai pro`v to`n h lion. a llo
ga`r tino`v eiInai h ge´nnhma h e ne´rgeian h pa´qov h kth˜ma, kai` a llo to` pro´v ti eiInai kai` le´gesqai –
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the distinction between the heat that is proper to fire (that is, the internal activity) and
the heat that fire produces in another thing (that is, the external activity), he does so
without using the language of the double activity theory.28 And Simplicius simply
does not make much use of mirrors.29 All of this, I believe, points to the conclusion
that Simplicius does not employ Plotinus’ distinction between internal and external
activity. If this is right, it perhaps does not imply that Simplicius’ views on the meta-
physics of procession are all that different from Plotinus’, but at the very least it would
show that there is sometimes a considerable difference in the way he goes about
describing those views.30
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‘Light, even if it is of the sun, is not said to be relative to the sun. For it is one thing to be a
product or activity or affection or possession of something, and another thing to be said and
to exist relative to something.’ Just before this he says only that light and heat are
sunupa´rconta and a cw´rista sumbebhko´ta of fire and the sun (181.32ff.). He only comes
close to the spirit of the double activity act at times, e.g. in Cat. 328.1: o h liov tw¼˜ eiInai
fwti´zei – ‘the sun produces light by its being.’ Contrast this with the application of the
double-activity theory to light in Ps.-Simpl. in De An. 131.17–23: ou ga´r e sti to` fw˜v, w v h
no´hsiv, e mme´nousa t}˜ proagou´s} au th`n ou si´a¼ kai` h au th` ouIsa t}˜ ou si´a¼˜ a ll e ne´rgeia me`n kai`
to` fw˜v, ou te de` h au th` tw¼˜ e nergou˜nti ou te me´nousa e n au tw¼˜ , ou mh`n ou de` a pespasme´nh, a ll
a ma te tou˜ kproo´ntovl au th` e come´nh kai` e te´rw¼ e ndidome´nh – ‘For light is not like intellection,
remaining in the substance that advanced it and being the same as that substance. But even
light is an activity, though neither being the same as that which activates it nor remaining in
it, but then again not being detached from it either, but rather it at once holds fast to what
kprecedesl it and is implanted in another.’ This perhaps provides additional grounds for the
spuriousness of in De Anima. (proi¨o´ntov at 131.20 does not give the right sense. I read
proo´ntov. Cf. C. Steel’s [n. 23] proposal proie´ntov [128 n. 74].)
28 So at in Cat. 230.16–18 Simplicius distinguishes between the heat of fire, which is natural
(fusikh´n), and the heat in hot water, which is a mere dia´qesiv (cf. 226.29ff.). In Cat. 248.29–33
at best finds some resonance with the theory.
29 ka´toptron occurs only three times in the corpus (in Cael. 384.4, 457.16, 21, 28).
30 I would like to thank Ian Mueller, David Rehm, and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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